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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal cor-~
poration,
Respondent,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant.

j

No. 6376

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
UPON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UT.A_H IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

HONORABLE BRYAN P. LEVERICH, JUDGE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal taken by the Defendant and Appellant from a judgment rendered in favor of the Plaintiff and Respondent by the District Court of Salt Lake
County.
The action 'vas brought by the Plaintiff, Salt Lake
City. a municipal corporation, to quiet title to a certain
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parcel of real property in Salt Lake City, County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, particularly described as follows:
All of lots eight (8), nine (9) and ten (10), in
Block 2, Plat "K", Salt Lake City Survey.
The property above described was conveyed to the
State of Utah by Salt Lake City on or about the 9th day
of July, A. D., 1895, in an indenture which is set forth
at page 1'7 of the Abstract of the Record and is as follows:
"This Indenture made the ninth day of July,
A. D. 1895, between Salt Lake City, a municipal
corporation in the Territory of Utah, the party of
the first part, and the Territory of Utah, the party
of the second part, witnesseth:
"That whereas Salt Lake City a municipal
corporation in the Territory of Utah the Grantor
herein is the owner of the real estate and property
hereinafter fully described, and whereas, the said
City has agreed to convey the said property to the
Territory of Utah, on the conditions and for the
purposes set forth in the following report of a
special committee of said City Council, duly appointed by said Council and the action of said
Council on said report, to-wit:
"Your Special Committee to confer with the
Governor and the Legislative Assembly to provide
for the transfer of certain land to the Territory of
Utah one acre of ground on the east side of State
Street and immediately south of the Capitol
Grounds and in such shape as may be acceptable
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to the Territory, said ground to be used for the site
of Executive Mansion.
"We also recommend that the deed of said
site carry with it the free use of City water for the
grounds and Mansion.
Respectifully submitted

1'1. K. Parsons
James Anderson
W. P. Lynn
"On motion of Councilman Pendleton, the
report was adopted and the l\1ayor given authority
to sign the deed, under the conditions specified.
"Roll call on vote stood as follows: Ayes:
"Councilman Parsons, Pendleton, Spafford,
Anderson, Pickard, Heath, Hyde, Folland, F arrick,
Lynn and James."
AND, WHEREAS: the Legislative Assembly
of the Territory of Utah adopted a joint resolution
accepting said property upon the conditions and
for the purposes, as specified in the report of the
said Special Committee and the action of the City
Council of said Salt Lake City on said report now
therefore, in consideration of the premises, and the
sum of One Dollar in hand paid by the said second
party, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged;
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto the said Territory of Utah,
the party of the second part, the following described real estate and property, to-wit:
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"All of Lots eight (8) nine (9) and ten (10) in
Block two, Plat "K" Salt Lake- City Survey the
same being situated and lying in Salt Lake City,
and County, 1'erritory of Utah, and also a sufficient
supply of water for use on said premises and any
building or buildings that may hereafter be erected
thereon free of cost to the party of the second part,
so long as said premises shall he used for a mansion
or residence by the Executive of said Territory, or
the State of Utah.
"But in case said property shall not be used
by said Territory or State for an Executive Mansion or residence, then this deed shall become void
and of no effect and said property with all the improvements and appurtenances thereon or thereto
belonging shall revert to and become the property
of the said party as fully and absolutely as if this
deed had not been made.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Salt Lake
City by its Mayor, R.N. Baskin has hereunto signed
and caused the Seal of Salt Lake City to be hereunto affixed in pursuance of the foregoing report
of said Special Committee and the resolution of
the City Council of Said City adopting said report.
Salt Lake City
By R. N. BASKIN
Mayor.
Signed in Presence of
Attest: W. A. McKay
G. H. Backman City Recorder
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SALT LAKE CITY SEAL"
A certified copy of the above Indenture was received
in evidence by the Court and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit
"C."
The Court also received in evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" as indicated in the exhibit list at page 21 of the
record and which is an Indenture by and between Jennie
J. Kearns, widow of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, party
of the first part, and the State of Utah, the party of the
second part, wherein Jennie J. Kearns conveyed a certain parcel of real property situated in Salt Lake City,
and the dwelling house located thereon, unto the State
of Utah; this gift was accepted by the State pursuant to
a legislative act kno,vn as Senate Bill Number 236, Chapter 151, Laws of Utah, 193'7. The act recited that the Jennie

J.

Kearns' property was to be used as a residence

for the Governor.
In view of the provisions in the deed between the
City and the State which is as follows:
"But in case said property shall not be used
by said Territory or State for an Executive Mansion or residence, then this deed shall become void
and of no effect and said property with all the improvements and appurtenances thereon or thereto
belonging shall revert to and become the property
of the said party as fully and absolutely as if this
deed had not been made."
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and the evidence offered by the City that the State had
accepted other property as a residence for the Governor,
the court below rendered its decision in favor of the
Plaintiff City and that decision is the subject of this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
1. The court erred in making and entering its finding of fact numbered 6, (page 26, Record), to-wit:
"That the said defendant State of Utah abandoned the use of said real property conveyed to it
by Salt Lake City for an executive mansion or residence as aforesaid and by the acceptance of the
said real property conveyed to it by Jennie J.
Kearns as aforesaid and the use by the State of
- Utah as its executive mansion or residence for its
Governor did terminate its fee in the deed conveying the real property from Salt Lake City plaintiff
to the State of Utah as aforesaid,"
for the reason that the finding is based on the fact that
the State had accepted the Jennie J. Kearns' property
to be used as a governor's mansion, and said finding is
contrary to law.
2. That the Court erred in making its conclusion
of law, numbered 1, (page 26, Record) as follows, to-wit:
"That by reason of the State of Utah defendant accepting the land described in the conveyance
by Jennie J. Kearns to the State of Utah and recorded in Book 198 of Deeds, pages 470-1. in the
office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County
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and dated April 28, 193?', pursuant to Chapter 151,
Laws of Utah, 193?', the said real property described
in the deed from the plaintiff Salt Lake City to
the defendant State of Utah dated July 9, 1895,
conveying Lots 8, 9 and 10, Block 2, Plat 'K,' Salt
Lake City Survey, has reverted to and become the
property of the plaintiff Salt Lake City."
That the Court erred making the following judgment, (page 28 of the Record), to-wit:
3.

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD JUDGED
AND DECREED:
That the plaintiff herein, Salt Lake City, is
the· owner of that certain lot or parcel of land situated, lying and being in the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, and bounded and described as follows, to-wit:
1.

That the defendant State of Utah has no interest or estate in said land or any part thereof and
that the title of the plaintiff in and to said real
property is good and valid.
"2.

That the defendent State of Utah is hereby
forever enjoined and debarred from asserting any
claim whatever in and to said land or premises."

"3.

ARGUMF;NT ONE
THE INDENTURE CONVEYING THE PROPERTY TO THE STATE OPERATED TO CONVEY TO
THE STATE OF UTAH A BASE FEE OR FEE DETERMINABLE SUBJECT TO A SPECIAL LIMITATION
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WITH A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER IN FAVOR
OF THE CITY AS GRANTOR.
The deed in question states therein:
"But in case said property shall not he used by
said terri tory or state, for an Executive Mansion or
residence then this deed shall become void and of
no effect. -J: -J: *" (Italics added)
Such a deed provides for termination of the estate
of the grantee by operation of law, not by act of the
parties, and, therefore, the estate granted to the State of
Utah is a fee determinable with a special limitation. A
"base" fee or a fee determinable terminates upon a special limitation; that is to say, that the State of Utah has
ownership of the property with all the attributes of a
fee simple estate which will be determined upon the happening of a certain event; it is subject to one special limitation and that limitation alone. The city as grantor by
such a deed reserved unto itself a mere possibility of reverter. Reference may he made to "Restatement of the
Law of Property" wherein in Section 23 a definition of
the term "special limitation" is set forth:
"The term 'special limitation' denotes that
part of the language of a conveyance 'vhich causes
the created interest automatically to expire upon
the occurence of a stated event, and thus provides
for a terminability in addition to that normally
characteristic of such interest."
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Note (b) of Section 23 specifies:
"Automatic expiration consists, historically,
in the ending of an interest in accordance with the
terms of its creating limitations."
The courts have recognized that such an estate may
be created. Reference may be made to the case of Yarborough vs. Yarborough, 151 Tenn. 221; 269 S. W. 36,
where the court devotes much of the opinion to an analysis of the characteristics of such an estate and states:
"There remains the question as to whether
the estate attempted to be created by the conveyancy before us was an estate upon condition or an
estate upon conditional limitation.
"The distinction between an estate upon condition and a conditional limitation is thus drawn
by Mr. Washburn:
"'In this and many other respects, an estate
upon condition, properly speaking, differs from
what is known as a conditional limitation. In
either case, the estate is a conditional one. But in
the one, though the event happen upon which the
estate may be defeated, it requires some act to be
done, such as making an entry, in order to effect
this. In the other, the happening of the event is,
in itself, the limit beyond which the estate no
longer exists, but is determined by the operation of
the law, without requiring any act to be done by
any one. In case of a condition at common law, the
grantor or his heirs alone can defeat the estate by
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entry for condition broken. In a conditional limitation, the estate determines, ipso facto, upon the
happening of the event, and goes over at once to
the grantor by reverter, or to the person to whom it
is limited
, ,, upon the happening of such contingency.
See also 296 N. Y. Sup. 341, page 350, and ?? A. L. R.
345, (Note 2); 51 A. L. R. 1466 and 14?3.
ARGUMENT TWO
THAT THE STATE HAD ABANDONED THE
PROPERTY WAS AN ERRONEOUS FINDING OF
FACT.
The finding of the court below that the appellant
herein had abandoned the use of the property conveyed
to it by the respondent, and that the fee of the appellant
terminated upon the acceptance of the Kearns' property
was not supported by competent evidence which could
justify such a finding and is contrary to law.
It is well settled that an abandonment is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, and that an, abandonment cannot give title to any other person or party,
hut merely throws the property open to the public domain. See Del Giorgio vs. Powers, 2? Cal. App. (2d) 668,
81 Pac. (2d) 1006.
In Thompso~ on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) Vol. S
P. 310, Section 2566, it is stated:
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"The characteristic element of abandonment
is the voluntary relinquishment of ownership. It
depends on an intention to abandon or relinquish,
coupled with son1e overt act or some failure to act,
"rhich carries the implication that the owner
neither claims nor retains any interest in the subject-matter of the abandonment. In order to justify
the conclusion that there has been abandonment
of property, there must be some clear and unmistakable affirmative act indicating a purpose to
repudiate the ownership thereof. It must be remembered that intent to relinquish ownership is
a material element in abandonment. ..~: . ~: . ~:"
See also Kimberlin vs. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 94 Pac.
(2d) 335, at 338, wherein the court stated:
"It was alleged that Eli abandoned his right
to use the real estate on or about August, 193?, and
moved to a town; that he made application for old
age assistance in which he stated that he did not
own, and had no interest in, any real estate. It is
argued that his interest in the real estate was extinguished by abandonment and that the interest
of the remaindermen was accelerated.
"In 1 C. J. S., Abandonment. Vol. 1, page 4, abandonment is defined: 'Abandonment of property or
a right is the voluntary relinquishment thereof by
its owner or holder, with the intention of terminating his ownership, possession and control, and without vesting ownership in any other person.'
"A title in fee simple cannot be lost by mere
abandonment~ Barrett vs. Coal Co., '70 Kan. 649,
?9 P. 150, and abandonment is not usually men-
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tioned as a methed by which a life estate may be
extinguished, Restatement, Property, Section 152;
21 C. J. 969. In Spencer vs. Smith, 74 Kan. 142, 145,
85 P. 573, it is stated that as a general rule title to
land cannot be lost by abandonment."
ARGUMENrf THREE
CONSTRUCTION OF A DEED MUST BE MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE GRAN1'EE AND FORFEITURES ARE NOT FAVORED.
In construing a deed, the grant must be construed
most favorably to the grantee. See Blackman vs. Striker,
142 N. Y. 55, 560 N. E. 484.
In construing a deed forfeitures are not favored.
Therefore, in analyzing the deed from the City to the
State, we must do so in accordance with the long established basic doctrines, that forfeitures are not favored,
but abhorred in the law. Van De Bogart vs. Reformed
Dutch Church of Poughkeepsie, 219 Appellate Div. 225;
220 N. Y. Sup. 58; 115 N. Y. 361; 22 N. E. 145; 5 L. R. A.
422; 12 American State Rpts. 809.
The importance of forfeitures is none the less because a deed was given without consideration. See 116

A. L. R. 6?.
From the foregoing long established rules of law
concerning the construction of deeds, it is the contention
of appellant that the court must lean toward the con-
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struction most favorable to the grantee. That- is, it 1nust
not only be aware of the deed, but also that should ituphold the verdict of the court below the appellant will
suffer a forfeiture. The court n1ust, therefore, make a
reasonable search for any reason, with regard to both
the facts and the la''' which ,,. . ould give it grounds to defeat the forfeiture.
ARGUMENT FOUR
THE POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENT MAY ONLY ARISE BY- MISUSER
AND NOT BY NON-USER.
The court below made its conclusion of law to the
effect that the property in question had reverted to and
become the property of the respondent city upon the acceptance by the State of the property of Jennie J. Kearns;
this was undoubtedly based upon the erroneous conclusion that since the State had not made use of the property
for a Governor's Mansion and had accepted by- legislative act a gift of another portion of property to be used
for the home of the Governor, that this fact gave rise to
the possibility of reverter outlined hy the special limitation clause in the deed. That is to say, that when the-State
acquired a Governor's Mansion, that it would no longer
use the property that was given to it by the city. It isthe contention of appellant that the possibility- of reverter
in the city may not arise until the_ State of Utah uses the
property for some other purpose than a Governor's Man-
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sion. This contention is confirmed and substantia ted by the
fact that the deed recites:
"But in case said property s h a ll n o t be
used***"
This can only be construed as meaning some time
in the future with no definite limitation. Reference may
be made to Vol. 6, "Words and Phrases," (Perm. Ed.),
p. 213,
"'A case' in ordinary parlance is that which
follows, comes, or happens; or an event."
The city councilmen and the mayor who executed
the deed knew, and must have anticipated the fact, that
there might be a considerable passage of time before the
State of Utah could build a suitable home for the executive. The deed confirms this in expressing:
"But in case said property shall not be used
by said territory or the State for an executive mansion or residence """ -J: *" (Italics added)
Surely the framers of this deed, executed at the time
Utah was a territory, must have intended that some time
would pass before use of the property could be made
properly because the deed itself included reference to
both territory and state. The fact that the State of Utah
recently accepted a gift of a home to be used as the Governor's Mansion is not proof or worthy evidence that the
State does not intend to use the property as shown in
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Exhibit "C" for the purposes to "chich said conveyance
is limited. The residence no"T used by the Governor n1a y
be vacated at some immediate future time, and as long
as the State of Utah has not used or attempted to use the
property "Thich is the subject of this action for any other
use, the possibility of reverter n1ay not arise in the city.
In the case of McKissick vs. Pickle, 16 Pa. St. Rep.
140, an individual granted and conveyed a lot of ground
to certain persons in trust, upon which erection of a school
house, and house of public worship was to take place for
the benefit of the public; the deed providing that should
the property be converted into any other use other than
a school house and a building for education of youths,
and a meeting-house for promulgating the gospel, and
also a burying-ground, and such other improvements as
may be advantageous and of use to the promotion of the
aforesaid three objects, that then and in that case, the
said lot shall revert to the party of the first part and to
his heirs and assigns. There was competent evidence presented to the court that for many years no school had
been taught in the building nor had any religious services been conducted. The court in construing this deed
u~ed the following language:

II·

"The proviso in the deed is entitled to a fair,
liberal, and benign interpretation, not according
to its letter, but its spirit. Viewing it in this aspect,
I cannot bring myself to believe that it was in the
conte1nplation of the parties (the grantor and those
who contributed- the funds to the erection of the
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building) that an occasional use of the property by
a tenant at will, for purposes other than those
mentioned in the deed, would work a forfeiture of
the estate. To produce that effect, it must be by
some permanent use different from those enumerated in the deed, such for example, as converting
the building into a factory, or the land attached
to it into arable land or pasture. The grant, being
for a charity, could not be forfeited for non-user,
nor for misuser except under an express condition
or contract; and although, in the latter case, it may,
yet it must he clearly, expressly, and strictly shown
that the condition was broken; 5 Watts 493, Martin
vs. McCord; 9 Barr, 433, Wright vs. Linn. The law
raises every intendment in favor of a charity,
against the grantor or those claiming under him;
public schools intended for the children in the
neighborhood are favorites in this State, and must
receive the protection and support as far as is reasonable, of the public tribunals. It must be kept
in view, that it is a misuser and not a non-user,
which produces the forfeiture. So runs the deed.
Throwing therefore, the non-user out of considera·
tion, what is the evidence of misuser," (Italics
added)
Of course, strictly speaking, the gift of the property
to the State of Utah was not a charitable gift but it was
motivated as a matter of civic pride, not only to the advantage of the State hut likewise to the city by insuring
that the Governor of the State would reside in the City,
and that a suitable location for the Governor's home
would be found. It is the contention of appellant that
there is a possibility that the property will be used some
time in the future for a site of the Governor's residence,
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and as long as that possibility exists, it cuts short the possibil:ity of reverter in favor of the city. Until that possibility is completely extinguished the special lin1itation in
favor of the city may not arise. See Vol. 2, Miner's Institutes, p. "!?, 1 Lomaxes Digest, p. 331, wherein Littleton
says:
"It is called a condition 'vhen something is
given on an uncertain event which may or may not
come into existence. ~-: -.-: *"
The city does not have reversion, it can only have as
distinguished therefrom a possibility of reverter, which
according to modern technical notion arises upon a grant
so limited that it may last forever or may terminate upon
a condition or contingency. It is only the possibility of
gaining the fee again which exists in the grantor after
the grant of a determinable or qualified fee. See Vol. 2,
C. J., p. 1017. See also Miner's on Real Property, (2d) 1012.
When was the possibility of reverter to the grantor
to he brought to a head? The answer is: At the instant
when there no longer remains the possibility of the estate
remaining absolute in the grantee under the terms of the
deed. That time could only arise when the State, as
grantee, uses the property for some purpose other than
a Governor's Mansion.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, based upon the foregoing authorities,
having in mind that the law abhores a forfeiture, it is the
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contention of the appellant that the court erred in finding
that the possibility of reverter has arisen, because of the
fact that there is still a "possibility" (in fact a certainty)
that the State of Utah will yet use the property described
in Exhibit "C" for the purposes set forth therein, and
that until the State of Utah attempts to use the property
for some other purpose, the special limitation has not
consummated itself or come to life, and that the property
still belongs to and is owned by the State of Utah in fee
simple determinable, and that the decision of the court
below should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES
Attorney General
S. D. HUFFAKER
Deputy Attorney General
A. JOHN BRENNAN
Assistant Attorney General
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